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 [501] 
The Inadequacies of the Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act of 2015 in the Age of Artificial 
Intelligence 
BERT LATHROP† 
The relentless accumulation of private consumer information through online services has 
dramatically expanded the attack surface available to cyber-criminals and belligerent state actors 
looking to either enrich themselves or disrupt digital service operations. In response to this 
growing threat and despite sharp criticism from privacy advocates, Congress passed the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA) with the aim of enabling private parties 
and the federal government to better protect themselves through improved availability of cyber 
threat intelligence. This intelligence is generally derived from organizations’ observations of 
activity on their systems and networks. CISA authorizes private entities, and state, local, and tribal 
governments, to share cyber threat intelligence with the federal government and among 
themselves. In exchange, participants are granted immunity from criminal and civil liability for 
their acts under the statute, and the federal government publishes redacted subsets of the collected 
intelligence. 
Coincidentally, artificial intelligence (AI) has recently emerged as a technology showing great 
promise in automating many tasks currently performed by humans, and cybersecurity analysis is 
no exception. CISA, drafted concurrently with this emergence, lacks the data-sharing 
authorizations necessary to leverage AI’s full utility. Deep learning, the AI technology showing 
the most promise, requires vast amounts of data providing evidence of normal system and network 
activity from which anomalous events associated with cyber-attacks can be differentiated. While 
CISA authorizes the sharing of the requisite data for such analyses in limited circumstances, this 
Note explores the opportunities AI affords cybersecurity practitioners, explains the shortcomings 
of CISA with respect to enabling AI to approach its full potential in cybersecurity applications, 
and offers a remedial proposal to those shortcomings. 
  
 
 †  Bert Lathrop is a 3L at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Prior to enrolling at 
U.C. Hastings, Bert was co-founder and Chief Operating Officer of Farsight Security, Inc., a cybersecurity firm 
that provides its subscription clients with cyber threat intelligence derived from global DNS transaction 
observations. Bert earned his M.B.A. degree from the N.Y.U. Stern School of Business, the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, and the HEC Paris School of Management, and his Bachelor of Science degree 
in Computer Information Systems, summa cum laude, from Excelsior College.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As the new millennium dawned, “about half of all adults were already 
online. Today, roughly nine-in-ten American adults use the [I]nternet.”1 Since 
2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center 
(IC3), “received more than 4 million victim complaints . . . . [In 2017 alone, the 
IC3] received more than 300,000 complaints . . . with reported losses of more 
than $1.4 billion.”2 In response to the escalating rate of Internet crime, circa 
2011, Congress began reviewing a number of proposals aimed at improving the 
availability of cyber threat intelligence to the private and public sectors.3  
While considerable debate exist[ed] with regard to the best strategies and 
methods for protecting America’s various cybersystems, one point of 
“general agreement” among cyber-analysts [was] the perceived need for 
enhanced and timely exchange of cyber threat intelligence both within the 
private sector and between the private sector and the government.4 
In December 2015, after much contentious debate at a policy level between 
security and privacy advocates,5 and at the solution level between proponents of 
various alternative bills,6 President Obama signed the Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA) into law.7  
To understand how CISA can affect cybersecurity effectiveness, it helps to 
have a basic understanding of how the Internet is organized. The Internet is 
generally composed of a multitude of private networks interconnected through 
the services of Internet service providers, or ISPs, and other backbone network 
providers. These many private networks are protected by cybersecurity 
practitioners through the use of a cybersecurity infrastructure, which requires 
detailed threat intelligence to allow bona fide users access to services while 
barring likely nefarious actors from harming the organization’s systems. 
Analogizing to castle defenses, CISA authorizes individual private castle owners 
to share cyber threat intelligence with other castle owners and with the federal 
government information regarding the identity of such nefarious actors, their 
modus operandi, and how to defend against their attacks. It also authorizes castle 
 
 1. Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 12, 2019), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/. 
 2. Latest Internet Crime Report Released: IC3 Says Victim Losses Exceeded $1.4 Billion in 2017, FBI 
NEWS (May 7, 2018), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718).   
 3. ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43941, CYBERSECURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING: 
LEGAL CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 43–58 (2015). 
 4. Id. at 3–4 (citing BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., CYBER SECURITY TASK FORCE: PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
INFORMATION SHARING 5 (July 2012), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Public-Private-
Information-Sharing.pdf). 
 5. See infra Subpart I.B.3. 
 6. See NOLAN, supra note 3, at 43–58. 
 7. 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–10 (2018). See Andy Greenberg, Congress Slips CISA into a Budget Bill That’s Sure 
to Pass, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2015, 12:24 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/12/congress-slips-cisa-into-omnibus-
bill-thats-sure-to-pass/; Everett Rosenfeld, The Controversial “Surveillance” Act Obama Just Signed, CNBC 
(Dec. 22, 2015, 12:34 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/22/the-controversial-surveillance-act-obama-just-
signed.html.  
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owners to monitor their respective castle walls, wall perimeters, and the space 
within their individual castles for discreet evidence of activity, equivalent to 
footprints in the snow that may provide clues about users’ activity, whether well-
intended or not. CISA does not authorize any castle owner to send any such 
evidence to other castle owners, but castle owners may authorize third parties—
presumably cybersecurity firms—to monitor those specific castles on behalf of 
their owners. This last authorization positions such third parties to accumulate 
and analyze evidence collected across all the castle defenses for which they are 
responsible, thus providing them with a unique bird’s-eye view of footsteps left 
in the snow not afforded to any individual castle owner unless they subscribe to 
such a cybersecurity firm’s services.8  
Although debates were very active between CISA proponents and privacy 
advocacy organizations prior to the passage of CISA,9 comparatively little has 
been written about it since.10 CISA was designed to address the government’s 
and the private sector’s needs for sharing information related to perceived cyber 
threats and related defensive measures, but it was not drafted with modern data 
science in mind, particularly artificial intelligence (AI). This Note takes a critical 
view of the authorizations and legal immunities afforded by CISA in light of the 
unforeseen risks and opportunities introduced by the advent of AI and its 
applications to the domain of cybersecurity.  
Part I provides a primer on the cybersecurity vocabulary necessary to 
appreciate the finer points of the argument of this Note, relevant provisions of 
CISA, and the context in which that statute was enacted, including the cyber 
threats our nation faced during the years leading up to its passage. Part II 
provides a perspective on the post-CISA cybersecurity context, including the 
ever-evolving cyber threat landscape, liability concerns that continue to chill 
participation in cyber threat intelligence sharing despite the legal immunities 
afforded by CISA, the advent of AI including its introduction into the cyber 
threat mix, and staffing issues facing organizations attempting to defend 
themselves in the context of an escalating cyber threat landscape. Part III 
outlines a proposal calling for new legislation that would amend CISA by 
expanding its data sharing authorization to include raw observational evidence 
of system and network activity between non-federal entities, and by refining the 
definition of personally identifiable information and limiting the sharing 
authorization for such information. Using a review and analysis of a similar data 
 
 8. While such a limitation may seem unfortunate, a statutory interpretation of CISA helps understand the 
tension between security and privacy interests that likely led to this limitation. See infra Subpart I.C.4. 
 9. The American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation actively argued against the 
passage of this legislation. See infra Subpart I.B.3.  
 10. Westlaw indicates no activity before the courts in relation to CISA, and only two law journal articles 
or notes appear to have been written about it. John Heidenreich, Note, The Privacy Issues Presented by the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 91 N.D. L. REV. 395 (2015) (discussing privacy concerns with CISA’s 
data sharing authorizations); Jamil N. Jaffer, Carrots and Sticks in Cyberspace: Addressing Key Issues in the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, 67 S.C. L. REV. 585 (2016) (discussing shortcomings related to 
the mechanics of execution of the functions authorized under CISA). 
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sharing proposal in the context of the European General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) legislation, this Part further demonstrates that the proposed 
data sharing enhancements are in the public interest, thus providing a 
counterargument to the concerns that privacy advocates would likely raise.  
Areas of additional possible research that are not within the scope of this 
Note include, but are not limited to, privacy-preserving data mining techniques 
in cybersecurity,11 policies such as retention periods and security requirements 
to be applied to shared cyber threat intelligence data, and the logistics that should 
enable non-federal entities in sharing data. 
I.  THE LANGUAGE AND CONTEXT OF CISA 
This section provides a primer on the cybersecurity vocabulary necessary 
to appreciate the finer points of this Note’s argument, as well as an overview of 
the context of the enactment of CISA and some of its relevant provisions. 
A. CYBERSECURITY—SELECT DEFINITIONS 
One challenging aspect of understanding cyber law is the degree of 
complexity of the technology and its unfamiliar jargon. Cybersecurity comes 
with a dense vocabulary of its own, evidenced by the more than two-hundred-
page information security glossary documented by the Information Technology 
Laboratory of the National Institute of Standards & Technology.12 The following 
are some definitions of terms useful for understanding CISA and its impact on 
cybersecurity. 
1. Cybersecurity Infrastructure 
Conceptually very broad, cybersecurity infrastructure “[i]ncludes 
electronic information and communications systems and services and the 
information contained in these systems and services. Information and 
communications systems and services are composed of all hardware and 
software that process, store, and communicate information, or any combination 
of all of these elements.”13 The physical elements of a well-appointed 
cybersecurity infrastructure include common servers and network routing and 
switching components, but may also include special-purpose cybersecurity 
 
 11. See, e.g., SUMEET DUA & XIAN DU, DATA MINING AND MACHINE LEARNING IN CYBERSECURITY 177–
203 (2011). 
 12. See generally RICHARD KISSEL, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., NISTIR 7298, GLOSSARY OF 
KEY INFORMATION SECURITY TERMS (2013) (archived publication). The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology is an organization whose mission is “to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by 
advancing . . . standards” in information technology. NIST General Information, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & 
TECH., https://www.nist.gov/director/pao/nist-general-information (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
 13. KISSEL, supra note 12, at 58. 
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appliances, such as firewalls,14 intrusion detection systems,15 or cloud-based 
cybersecurity services, like file reputation services.16  
2. Cyber Threat Intelligence 
In his research at the SANS Institute, Greg Farnham defined cyber threat 
intelligence as “threat intelligence related to computers, networks and 
information technology.”17 It is “the information and knowledge about an 
adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or 
understanding, [and] is the product that provides battlespace awareness.”18  
Cyber threat intelligence is produced through the analysis of large 
quantities of raw data and information, producing relevant, actionable 
intelligence, but raw data and information alone do not constitute cyber threat 
intelligence.19 Depending on the form of analysis used to produce it, cyber threat 
intelligence falls into three broad categories: strategic, tactical, and 
operational.20  
“Strategic threat intelligence is a bird’s-eye view of an organization’s 
threat landscape. Not concerned with specific actors, indicators, or attacks, it 
instead aims to help high-level strategists understand the broader impact of 
business decisions [on the cybersecurity posture of an organization].”21  
Tactical threat intelligence provides information about the tactics, techniques, 
and procedures . . . used by threat actors to achieve their goals (e.g., to 
compromise networks, exfiltrate data, and so on). It’s intended to help defenders 
understand how their organization is likely to be attacked, so they can determine 
whether appropriate detection and mitigation mechanisms exist or whether they 
need to be implemented.22 
“Operational threat intelligence relates to specific attacks or campaigns. It 
helps defenders understand the nature, intent, and timing of a specific 
attack . . . provides insight into the nature and sophistication of the group(s) 
responsible,”23 and focuses on the discrete data elements that identify threats to 
an organization’s information processing infrastructure, applications, and data. 
 
 14. Id. at 79. 
 15. Id. at 104. 
 16. See, e.g., TITANIUMCLOUD: File Reputation, REVERSINGLABS, https://www.reversinglabs.com/ 
products/file-reputation-service (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
 17. GREG FARNHAM, TOOLS AND STANDARDS FOR CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS 8 (2013), 
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/warfare/tools-standards-cyber-threat-intelligence-projects-
34375. 
 18. Id. (citing EDWARD WALTZ, INFORMATION WARFARE PRINCIPLES AND OPERATIONS (1998)). 
 19. Zane Pokorny, What Is Threat Intelligence? Definition and Examples, RECORDED FUTURE (Apr. 30, 
2019), https://www.recordedfuture.com/threat-intelligence-definition/. 
 20. Id. 
 21. How Strategic Threat Intelligence Informs Better Security Decisions, RECORDED FUTURE (Sept. 13, 
2018), https://www.recordedfuture.com/strategic-threat-intelligence/. 
 22. Id. 
 23. How Operational Threat Intelligence Blocks Attacks Before They Happen, RECORDED FUTURE (Sept. 
25, 2018), https://www.recordedfuture.com/operational-threat-intelligence/. 
508 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:501 
A key distinction between operational and strategic cyber threat 
intelligence is that the former endeavors to discover and catalog nefarious 
actors’ technical specifics including IP addresses, email addresses, or modus 
operandi to later inhibit any cyber-attacks those actors may attempt to perpetrate, 
whereas the latter is a narrative of the aspects of an organization that would 
likely cause, or at least promote, the existence of a threat without knowing of 
any specific threat attributes.  
If the computer systems and special purpose appliances that make up an 
organization’s physical cybersecurity infrastructure and the cybersecurity-
specific applications hosted by those systems altogether are the engines that 
power cyber-defense capability, then it is easy to think of operational threat 
intelligence as the data necessary to direct or target the efforts of those engines. 
a. Cyber Threat Indicators (CTIs) 
A type of operational cyber threat intelligence, CTIs are the sets of data 
elements necessary to describe or identify a threat or risk to computer systems 
or networks. They may include any combination of an identifiable pattern of24: 
• malicious network reconnaissance activity,25  
• a malicious cyber command and control,26  
• a method for defeating security controls,27  
• a security vulnerability,  
 
 24. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FINAL PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE RECEIPT OF 
CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 13 (2016) [hereinafter 
DHS & DOJ]. 
 25. See generally H. P. Sanghvi & M. S. Dahiya, Cyber Reconnaissance: An Alarm Before Cyber Attack, 
63 INT’L J. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 36 (2013). 
 26. Botnets are autonomous, drone-like programs that, once infiltrated and installed in a target 
environment, act under the direction of a malicious cyber command and control (C&C) that instructs them 
through communication pathways that range from the very simple to the arbitrarily complex. E.g., GameOver 
Zeus Botnet Disrupted: Collaborative Effort Among International Partners, FBI NEWS (last updated July 11, 
2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/gameover-zeus-botnet-disrupted; see DUA & DU, supra note 11, at 
209–11 (2011) (detailing, in section 9.1.2, general characteristics of botnet detection and eradication methods); 
DHS & DOJ, supra note 24, at 14. An initial bot is generally introduced into the target organization through 
some form of malicious code attack, for example, a phishing campaign that infects one or more computers in the 
target network. Once introduced, the bot spreads through the target computer network like a virus, replicating 
itself across computer systems by leveraging one or more known system vulnerabilities. The bots then persist 
on the infected systems, awaiting the receipt of instructions from the malicious C&C, whether by reaching back 
out periodically to a pre-configured URL or IP address, see KISSEL, supra note 12, at 104, or indirectly through 
another infected system as with the GameOver Zeus botnet. A CTI documenting the details of a botnet would, 
of course, include such details as the malicious code CTI that introduces the botnet, the URL(s) and/or IP 
addresses to which the bots connect or the algorithm by which they calculate these at any given moment, and a 
narrative describing the behavior and nefarious effects of the botnet. This definition is not intended to provide a 
complete typology of possible botnet configurations, but rather to demonstrate that URLs and IP addresses are 
fundamental to the description of a botnet CTI. 
 27. See KISSEL, supra note 12, at 175–76. 
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• a method for causing a legitimate user to unwittingly defeat a security 
control,28  
• the actual or potential harm caused by a cybersecurity incident including any 
data exfiltrated as a result,29 or  
• “any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if disclosure of such attribute is 
not otherwise prohibited by law.”30  
The discrete data elements used to document a CTI may include indicators 
of compromise (IOCs)31 or any other raw data necessary to adequately complete 
the characterization of the threat or risk. 
CTIs may describe any matter of cyber-risk, including malicious code or 
malware,32 a phishing attack, or a botnet. A CTI is a complex data structure that 
 
 28. A user may unwittingly defeat an organization’s security controls by falling victim to a phishing attack. 
See KISSEL, supra note 12, at 142; see also DUA & DU, supra note 11, at 208 (describing, at section 9.1.1, a 
phishing attack resulting in the introduction of malware onto a user’s system). Such attacks may be broad, that 
is, sent to a large email list purchased on the black market, or narrowly targeted at select individuals within an 
organization after extensive research into their personal details, which is considered a more insidious activity 
known as spear phishing. E.g., Sean Michael Kerner, Sony Hackers Used Apple ID Phishing Scheme, 
Researchers Claim at RSA, EWEEK (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.eweek.com/security/sony-hackers-used-apple-
id-phishing-scheme-researchers-claim-at-rsa. Invariably, the email will contain a URL, see Memorandum from 
Tim Berners-Lee, et al., on Uniform Resource Locators (URL) to Networking Working Group (Dec. 1994), 
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1738.txt, or a website link the receiver is invited to click, which then takes her to a 
malicious website soliciting her personal details. E.g., The Phishing Email That Hacked the Account of John 
Podesta, CBS NEWS (Oct. 28, 2016, 11:43 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-phishing-email-that-
hacked-the-account-of-john-podesta/. A phishing attack CTI would include the email envelope or header 
including the sender’s email address, the email body including the malicious URL, and a narrative of the 
behavior of the malicious website or resource linked to the malicious URL. Methods for gathering the data 
necessary to populate a phishing CTI include human intelligence, for example, the email recipient comparing 
the URL to what he knows to be valid in context and reporting a suspicious email to his cybersecurity team; 
policy-based screening automation, that is, the email recipient clicks the URL link and is protected by 
infrastructure designed to block and report against entire classes of high-risk Internet domain names, see, e.g., 
Newly Observed Domains: Threat Protection from New Domains, FARSIGHT SECURITY, 
https://www.farsightsecurity.com/solutions/threat-intelligence-team/newly-observed-domains/ (last visited Jan. 
24, 2020), or detailed forensic analysis of a particular phishing attack a specific user has experienced. 
 29. See Exfiltration: The Adversary Is Trying to Steal Data, MITRE, 
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (providing a definition for exfiltration and 
examples of techniques). 
 30. See DHS & DOJ, supra note 24, at 13.  
 31. See infra Subpart I.A.1.c. 
 32. A CTI describing malicious code or malware would likely include such IOCs as the name of the file 
containing the malicious code, the file size, and a uniquely identifying signature of the file. See DUA & DU, 
supra note 11, at 208 (describing, in section 9.1.1, a phishing attack resulting in the introduction of malware 
onto a user’s system); see also KISSEL, supra note 12, at 84, 118. In such a CTI, IOCs would likely be 
accompanied by a narrative detailing the nefarious behavior of the malware. E.g., Reports, VIRUSTOTAL, 
https://support.virustotal.com/hc/en-us/articles/115002719069-Reports (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (detailing the 
elements of a sample malicious code attack signature). A malware CTI generally results from a static analysis 
of the file content and/or dynamic observation of the malicious code’s behavior in an isolated execution 
environment or sandbox. E.g., Active File Decomposition, REVERSINGLABS, 
http://reversinglabs.com/technology/active-file-decomposition.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (detailing 
technology capable of decomposing a file down to discrete instructions in order to detect malicious fragments 
within); Symantec Content & Malware Analysis, SYMANTEC, https://www.symantec.com/products/atp-content-
malware-analysis (last visited Jan. 24, 2020); see also KISSEL, supra note 12, at 168 (detailing file behavior 
analysis in a quarantined computing environment). 
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often requires significant analysis before a cybersecurity analyst can complete 
its documentation. CTIs are composed of IOCs, which may contain personally 
identifiable information (PII),33 and are accompanied by a narrative putting 
those IOCs in the context of the threat described.  
Once compiled, CTIs are shared with peers either directly or through 
community sharing schemes, including the federal government as authorized 
under CISA.34 CTI recipients, now informed of the characteristics of a given 
cyber threat, can use this information to develop defensive measures and 
configure them into their systems and cybersecurity infrastructure to defeat the 
threat detailed in the CTI.35 
b. Defensive Measures (DMs) 
Like CTIs, DMs are also a form of operational cyber threat intelligence. 
Once a CTI is documented, a related DM might also be documented, detailing 
inhibiting or defensive tactics to protect against the threat defined in the CTI, if 
those details are known. For example, a DM for a phishing threat would likely 
include instructions to simply inhibit any outbound connection requests to the 
malicious URL detailed in the CTI for that phishing attempt. Similarly, the DM 
for a particular element of malicious code might include clues for detecting the 
file, such as the unique signature identifying the file, and instructions for placing 
the malicious elements of that code in quarantine on infected systems. Sharing 
DMs among cyber threat analysts allows the research performed by one to be 
leveraged by many, thus improving the efficiency of devising and deploying 
proven cyber defenses.  
 
 33. For example, email or IP addresses. Personally identifiable information (PII) definitions vary by 
jurisdiction. Notable definitions include those of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the 
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA). The GDPR defines “personal data” as:  
 [A]ny information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an 
identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier 
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural 
or social identity of that natural person.”   
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of 
Natural Persons With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and 
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33. The CCPA defines 
“personal information” as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, 
or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household,” and supplements 
that definition with a non-exhaustive list of examples of the types of information that constitute personal 
information. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2019). The inclusion of PII in CTIs fuels the debate 
between privacy advocates who would prefer that no such data be shared for the sake of privacy, and security 
minded practitioners who suggest that the effectiveness of cybersecurity defenses is enhanced by the availability 
of data that provide situational awareness. See infra Subpart I.B.3. 
 34. See infra Subpart I.C. 
 35. See infra Subpart I.A.1.b. 
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c. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) 
Greg Farnham defines IOCs as “one of the most easily actionable types of 
[cyber threat intelligence] . . . . Some of the most commonly used IOCs are IP 
addresses, domain names, uniform resource locators (URLs) and file 
[signatures].”36 They are the results of detailed analyses sufficient to draw a 
judgment of potential threat or risk. As IOCs are attack-specific, they are not 
particularly useful or actionable absent the context of the attack where they were 
observed. For example, an email address in and of itself is not actionable, but 
that same address can be added to an email blocking list as a DM if that email 
address has been identified as the source of a phishing attack. Further examples 
of the operational use of IOCs include using a list of file signatures associated 
with files known to contain malicious code to inform an anti-virus application 
or using a blacklist of threatening URLs to inhibit user connections to the 
Internet resources associated with those URLs. IOCs are critical to cyber 
defense, as they are the necessary data cyber-analysts use to configure the 
cybersecurity infrastructure guarding an organization’s systems and networks. 
3. Raw Observational Data (ROD) 
It is common practice in network and data center operations to log detailed 
user system and network activity (raw observational data or ROD). While ROD 
is not a concept exclusive to cybersecurity or to its vocabulary, for the purposes 
of this Note, ROD is defined as the data collected as trace evidence of activity 
on an organization’s systems and networks. Systems operations support staff and 
cybersecurity analysts routinely analyze ROD in support of their respective 
functions, including real-time surveillance activities, forensic investigations, 
and the documentation of CTIs and cyber-crime reports for law enforcement.37  
One may liken ROD, which may include email addresses, domain names, 
URLs, or IP addresses, to footprints left in the snow by those interacting with an 
organization’s systems and networks. As these footprints may be evidence of the 
identity of the actor communicating with the organization in that moment, they 
can be very useful to a cybersecurity analyst to track down a nefarious actor who 
has infiltrated an organization’s network and system resources, or otherwise 
attribute a cyber-crime to its perpetrator. Unlike a CTI, ROD does not associate 
any judgment of risk or attribution with the data elements within it; its presence 
in a log file or data stream is a mere fact of recorded system and network activity 
history.  
A specific example of ROD with direct applicability to cybersecurity is 
“passive DNS” data,38 evidence of a query-response exchange between an 
 
 36. FARNHAM, supra note 17, at 8. 
 37. Id. at 9. 
 38. See Cricket Liu, Strengthen Your Network Security with Passive DNS, INFOWORLD (Oct. 20, 2015), 
https://www.infoworld.com/article/2994016/network-security/strengthen-your-network-security-with-passive-
dns.html; see also FLORIAN WEIMER, PASSIVE DNS REPLICATION (2005), https://www.first.org/conference/ 
2005/papers/florian-weimer-paper-1.pdf.  
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organization’s network infrastructure and the global Domain Name System 
(DNS).39 Such exchanges happen routinely as an organization’s users attempt to 
access Internet resources previously unknown to the organization’s network.40 
Being able to look retrospectively at the evidence of such exchanges is 
invaluable to investigating a cyber-attack,41 such as in the case of a phishing 
attack where a new nefarious domain name was presented to an unsuspecting 
user, inviting the user to access the domain to initiate the phishing attack.42 
While CISA specifically authorizes the sharing of CTIs and DMs among 
various stakeholders, it does not authorize the sharing of ROD except in the very 
narrow circumstance of an authorized third-party network monitoring activity.43 
The specific reasons for the exclusion of such valuable data from the sharing 
authorization provisions are not known with precision, but the compromise 
between security- and privacy-minded arguments likely explain it.44  
Under CISA, unless necessary to properly document a CTI or DM, PII 
must be redacted before either type of report is shared.45 On the other hand, as 
ROD most often documents evidence of a specific user’s system and network 
activity, it must contain a modicum of PII lest it be rendered valueless. As a 
result, organizations collecting ROD and their system users harbor much greater 
privacy concerns regarding ROD as its content is often more sensitive than that 
of CTIs or DMs from which all unnecessary PII must be redacted under CISA.46  
B. CYBERSECURITY RISKS PRIOR TO 2015 AND THE CONGRESSIONAL 
RESPONSE 
1. Cyber-Crimes Moved to the Headlines 
During the years leading up to the fall of 2015, a number of high-profile 
cyber-attacks were perpetrated against prominent U.S. corporations and 
government agencies.47 The most prominent of these attacks, the Anthem data 
 
 39. Memorandum from Paul Mockapetris on Domain Names—Implementation and Specification to 
Network Working Group (Nov. 1987), https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Commercial cybersecurity companies harvest Passive DNS data across many organizations’ networks 
to create a database providing a time-series, composite view of the content of the global Domain Name System 
in support of complex, cross-network forensic investigations. See e.g., Plug into the World’s Largest DNS 
Intelligence Solution: DNSDB, FARSIGHT SECURITY, https://www.farsightsecurity.com/solutions/dnsdb/ (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2020). Such databases do not provide any form of risk scoring associated with an IOC, but may 
answer questions regarding a suspect domain name, including IP addresses that have historically hosted the 
domain, or the set of other domains that are or have been hosted on a same IP network address range, that is, 
known associates in law enforcement parlance. Id.  
 42. See supra note 28 (explaining the risks associated with phishing attacks). 
 43. See infra Subpart I.C (providing an overview of the relevant provisions of CISA).  
 44. See infra Subpart I.B.3 (outlining the controversies surrounding the passage of CISA and the resulting 
compromise provisions of the bill). 
 45. See infra Subpart I.C. 
 46. See infra Subpart I.C. 
 47. E.g., Jim Finkle, Hackers Raid eBay in Historic Breach, Access 145 Million Records, REUTERS (May 
21, 2014, 8:01 PM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ebay-password/hackers-raid-ebay-in-historic-breach-
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breach perpetrated by two Chinese nationals, was documented in a federal grand 
jury indictment unsealed in 2019.48 Tens of millions of credit card numbers were 
stolen in a single attack on the Target store chain,49 and several such attacks were 
successful against a variety of large store chains and retail banks.50 Agents acting 
on behalf of the North Korean government allegedly attacked the Bank of 
Bangladesh, making away with $81 million.51 And “[i]n perhaps the most 
infamous cyberattack of 2014 . . . Sony Pictures Entertainment suffered a 
‘significant system disruption’ as a result of a ‘brazen cyber-attack’ [also 
attributed to the North Korean government] that resulted in the leaking of 
personal details of thousands of Sony employees.”52  
The public felt the impact of these cyber-attacks directly as they 
jeopardized health records, financial data, or other private information of 
hundreds of millions of U.S. residents. As a result, the reality of cyber-risk 
moved front and center in the public debate. Although cybersecurity 
practitioners continued to cite current and former employees most frequently as 
the culprits for cybersecurity incidents,53 this time period saw a marked 
acceleration in attacks attributable to organized crime and nation-state actors.54  
2. Early Attempts to Implement Legislative Solutions Fail  
Between 2011 and 2014, a number of bills aimed at providing a statutory 
framework for the exchange of cyber threat intelligence between the private 
sector and the federal government were introduced in both houses of Congress.55 
 
access-145-million-records-idUKKBN0E10ZL20140522; Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Breach Data of 4 Million 
Federal Workers, WASH. POST (June 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
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d580f1c5d44e_story.html?utm_term=.2ac; Ellen Nakashima, Hackers Breach Some White House Computers, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-hackers-
breach-federal-governments-personnel-office/2015/06/04/889c0e52-0af7-11e5-95fdd580f1c5d44e_story.html;  
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https://money.cnn.com/2013/12/22/news/companies/target-credit-card-hack/index.html; Michael Winter, Home 
Depot Hackers Used Vendor Log-On to Steal Data, E-mails, USA TODAY, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/11/06/home-depot-hackers-stolen-data/18613167/ (last 
updated Nov. 7, 2014, 8:57 AM).  
 48. Nicole Perlroth, Two From China Are Charged in 2014 Anthem Data Breach, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/technology/anthem-hack-indicted-
breach.html?searchResultPosition=1.  
 49. See Wallace, supra note 47. 
 50. See supra note 47. 
 51. Criminal Complaint at 3, United States v. Park Jin Hyok, No. MJ18-1479 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018).  
 52. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 1 (quoting Press Release, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Message for Current 
and Former Sony Pictures Employees and Dependents, and for Production Employees (Dec. 15, 2014), 
http://www.sonypictures.net/SPE_Cyber_Notification.pdf?) (citing Amelia Smith, Sony Cyber Attack One of 
Worst in Corporate History, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 4, 2014, 1:14 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/sony-cyber-
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 53. PWC, MANAGING CYBER RISKS IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD: KEY FINDINGS FROM THE GLOBAL 
STATE OF INFORMATION SECURITY SURVEY 2015 13 (2014).  
 54. See id. at 15. 
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For example, in late 2011, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act 
(CISPA) was introduced to the U.S. House of Representatives.56 Despite a strong 
consensus and bipartisan approval in the U.S. House of Representatives,57 the 
U.S. Senate defeated CISPA through a filibuster, citing its lack of specific 
protection for critical infrastructure.58  
The Snowden disclosures of 2013 appeared to dramatically change the 
political climate surrounding cybersecurity legislation.59 The public had learned 
of the federal government’s widespread data collection and surveillance 
strategies, which cast a notable chill on any bills advocating the sharing of cyber 
threat intelligence with the federal government.60 Further, those disclosures 
incentivized privacy advocates to redouble their lobbying efforts.61 As a result, 
until 2015, bills aiming to authorize the sharing of cyber threat intelligence with 
the federal government were defeated on the grounds of privacy concerns, which 
were acknowledged by both sides of the aisle and by President Obama.62  
3. CISA Enacted in 2015 Despite Significant Privacy Concerns 
Despite its many failed attempts to pass legislation to improve the nation’s 
cyber threat intelligence capabilities, Congress continued its efforts to find a 
solution. As indicated in the Senate report on the activities of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence covering the period of January 6, 2015 to January 2, 
2017, “[b]uilding on the [Intelligence] Committee-reported Cyber Information 
Sharing Act (CISA) during the 113th Congress, the Committee reported an 
updated Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (S. 754) on March 17, 
2015. The bill included authorizations, procedures, and protections to encourage 
public/private collaboration on cybersecurity threats.”63 
The shaping and ultimate passage of CISA proved particularly 
controversial.64 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce came out in favor of the bill, 
 
 56. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 3523, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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 61. See, e.g., CISPA Is Back, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
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 63. S. REP. NO. 115-13, at 2 (2017).  
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suggesting that it was the progress the United States required to improve the 
security of its businesses and government.65 Privacy advocacy groups such as 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) each expressed strong opposition to the bill, citing grave 
privacy concerns with CISA’s new data sharing authorizations.66 A group of 
cybersecurity professionals and other technologists joined the chorus of 
dissenters, suggesting that the privacy risks introduced by CISA were not worth 
the limited value of CTIs and DMs to their cybersecurity analysis needs.67 
Likewise, a diverse group of large Silicon Valley tech companies, which 
safeguard a great deal of private consumer data, were eager to demonstrate their 
support for individual privacy rights by lobbying against the bill.68  
On April 15, 2015, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
recommended the passage of CISA.69 The divergent opinions of security-
conscious and privacy-conscious stakeholders were clearly reflected in the 
committee report. On the one hand, Senators Heinrich and Hirono felt compelled 
to note that, while they supported the “broad aims” of the bill, it  
[P]rovides more restraints, guidance, and oversight than did the earlier draft 
version of the legislation, including a narrowing of the definition and 
authorized use of defensive measures, fewer exceptions for liability 
protections for information shared outside of the DHS portal, and more limits 
on how cyber threat information is used.70  
On the other hand, Senator Wyden voiced his dissent in opposition to the bill, 
suggesting he believed the bill’s “insufficient privacy protections will lead to 
large amounts of personal information being shared with the government even 
when that information is not needed for cybersecurity. This could include email 
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content, financial records, and a wide variety of other personal information.”71 
These senators felt compelled to register their respective points, which live at 
opposite ends of the spectrum in the security-privacy balance, suggesting that 
the content of the bill was a compromise of opposing views. 
Nevertheless, on October 27, 2015, the Senate passed CISA by a vote of 
seventy-four to twenty-one and, in an effort to end debate and overcome a 
threatened presidential veto, “it was incorporated into and became law as part of 
H.R. 2029 [the $1.1 trillion 2016 omnibus funding bill] on December 18, 
2015.”72 Despite the chilled climate brought on by the Snowden disclosures, the 
escalating headlines describing one more devastating cyber-crime after the next 
likely incentivized Congress to act, passing a particularly controversial piece of 
legislation. 
C. RELEVANT CISA PROVISIONS  
CISA establishes a cyber threat intelligence sharing scheme between the 
federal government, and private entities, state, local, and tribal governments (all 
together “non-federal entities” or “NFEs”),73 and among NFEs. Program 
participants are provided with broad liability protection for their actions under 
the statute. 
1. Role of the Department of Homeland Security 
CISA designates the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the 
agency with operational responsibility for a cybersecurity information sharing 
service.74 Through this service, the DHS is required to process the receipt of 
[CTIs] and [DMs] from NFEs “through an automated real-time exchange, 
electronic mail or media, or a website interface.”75 Further, the DHS is required 
to publish, in real-time if possible, various subsets of the cyber threat intelligence 
it receives under CISA to NFEs and appropriate federal agencies,76 depending 
on their respective levels of security clearance.77 
2. Authorization to Share CTIs and DMs and to Monitor Systems 
Under CISA, NFEs are authorized to share CTIs and DMs with the federal 
government and/or with other NFEs for cybersecurity purposes only.78 They are 
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 73. 6 U.S.C. § 1501(14). 
 74. See id. §§ 1501(6–7), 1504(c).  
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 76. 6 U.S.C. § 1501(3). 
 77. Id. § 1502. 
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also authorized to operate DMs within their respective systems and networks,79 
and to monitor their own systems and networks and the systems and networks 
of other NFEs or federal entities, provided they are authorized by those entities 
to do so.80 The term “monitor” is given an expansive meaning under CISA, 
including “to acquire, identify, or scan, or to possess, information that is stored 
on, processed by, or transiting an information system,”81 for cybersecurity 
purposes.82 CISA defines a cybersecurity purpose as “the purpose of protecting 
an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or 
transiting an information system from a cybersecurity threat or security 
vulnerability.”83 Therefore, assuming that cybersecurity purposes would 
naturally include cyber-analysts’ analyses of data collected through authorized 
monitoring activities, a textualist interpretation of these provisions suggests that 
the CISA-authorized monitoring includes, for cybersecurity purposes, the 
collection, possession, and analysis of ROD.84  
3. Immunity from Suit for Acts of Sharing or Monitoring 
Andrew Nolan reported to Congress that “[p]erhaps the most heavily 
debated legal issue respecting cyber-information sharing legislation is how to 
adequately minimize the host of liability issues that may arise for those in the 
private sector that may wish to disclose cyber-intelligence to outsiders.”85 
Through its authorization for NFEs to share CTIs and DMs that may contain 
private information, CISA creates liability risk for program participants. Actions 
could be brought under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
with relation to the monitoring of systems and networks and under federal or 
state privacy laws with relation to data being shared. Further, under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, NFEs could incur criminal or civil liability for the sharing of CTIs 
and DMs as those actions could be construed as a “group boycott, or concerted 
refusals by traders to deal with other traders.”86  
To address this issue, CISA includes liability protection for participants 
sharing cyber threat intelligence under the statute. This immunity is an essential 
provision of the statute, as no reasonable NFE would participate in the program 
otherwise. A tailored approach to providing such liability protection may well 
have been impossible to craft, as drafters would have needed to apply 
forethought into all the legal theories under which NFEs could have incurred 
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liability for their acts under CISA.87 Therefore, Congress chose to apply “broad 
immunity” from criminal and civil liability for NFEs’ lawful acts under CISA.88  
4. No Authorization for the Sharing of ROD 
Conspicuously missing from the list of authorized acts under CISA-defined 
monitoring are the acts of giving or sharing of ROD—an NFE sending data 
already collected by itself through a monitoring process of its own network to a 
third-party.89 Although the statute authorizes third-parties, presumably 
cybersecurity companies, which are NFEs in their own right, to harvest ROD 
through monitoring activities and to analyze that data for cybersecurity 
purposes,90 it does not explicitly authorize NFEs or federal agencies to send their 
data to such third-parties for that same purpose.91  
This confusing interpretation of the data sharing authorized under CISA is 
evidence of ambiguity in the meaning of the statute. In case of a dispute, the 
courts would likely first apply a textualist interpretation through the plain 
meaning rule.92 Thus, in the absence of an explicit authorization for an NFE to 
send ROD previously collected on its own network to a third party, a textualist 
interpretation of CISA-defined monitoring requires that we infer that Congress 
never intended to authorize an NFE to send ROD that it collected on its own 
systems. There are good reasons for such an interpretation, as consumers’ 
privacy rights could easily be trampled if every NFE was authorized to send any 
data collected on its own systems, even if that authorization was explicitly 
limited to cybersecurity purposes only. On the other hand, drawing a textualist 
distinction between authorizing a third-party to monitor an NFE’s systems and 
thereby harvesting and transporting any data so captured, and an NFE 
monitoring its own systems and then sending that data to another NFE, that is, a 
cybersecurity firm—the activity not explicitly authorized—seems like a 
distinction without a difference. In both cases, the ROD is harvested in the same 
place and would likely end up in the possession of the same third-party. The 
only subtle difference rests in which party initiates and performs the initial data 
collection.  
In the absence of a clear textual meaning of a statute, one of the parties in 
a controversy might ask the courts to apply alternative interpretations, including 
intentionalist and purposivist interpretations.93 At the time Congress was 
considering CISA, the Congressional Research Service prepared a detailed 
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report providing perspective on an escalating cybersecurity risk landscape, on 
the existing legal framework supporting the sharing of cyber threat intelligence 
or lack thereof, and on the features of various proposed alternative legislative 
options considered.94 While the report illustrates a thoughtful approach in 
determining the types of data to be shared, such as CTIs and DMs at the 
exclusion of ROD,95 the report offers little to no insight regarding the various 
possible interpretations of the act of monitoring, rendering an intentionalist 
interpretation fruitless.  
The courts may further seek meaning through an interpretation of the 
purpose of the statute as may be inferred from the broader context of its passage. 
Citing examples of recent prominent breaches, Congressional materials 
suggested that the “stated priorities of the President and congressional leadership 
[was] to enact laws that ensure that both the public and private sector are 
prepared to meet the cyber-challenges of the future.”96 Given such a broad 
mission and scope, one could be tempted to apply an equally broad interpretation 
of the definition of monitoring. However, the risks to privacy under such a 
wholesale data sharing authorization would be so great, even if limited to 
cybersecurity purposes only, that the courts would likely dismiss that 
interpretation. Therefore, as intentionalist and purposivist interpretations 
provide little to no additional guidance, we are left with the unsatisfying 
textualist interpretation defined above.  
The resulting gap in explicit authorization for the sending of ROD creates 
a corresponding gap in the immunity afforded to NFEs under CISA.97 In the 
absence of the immunity afforded by CISA, an NFE could have incurred liability 
under the Sherman Antitrust Act for acts of sharing CTIs containing IOCs 
identifying third-parties with whom the NFE perceived risk of communication.98 
The sharing of ROD, on the other hand, which is void of the negative judgment 
inherent to CTIs, poses minimal risks under the Sherman Antitrust Act, but risks 
of actions brought under federal and state privacy laws remain. This lack of 
immunity for the sending of ROD under CISA effectively precludes those 
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activities except in the narrow circumstance of authorized third-party 
monitoring.  
II.  THE POST-CISA CYBERSECURITY CONTEXT AND THE ADVENT OF AI 
The post-CISA facts do not bode well for Internet security. In the words of 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in March 2017:  
The serious and growing number of cyber threats has been the subject of 
significant [Intelligence] Committee oversight and extensive testimony from 
senior [Committee] officials. The Committee has reviewed many troubling 
cybersecurity incidents and focused considerable attention on malicious 
actors’ efforts in cyberspace to inflict harm in the short term, and to intensify 
their capabilities over the long term. . . . Foreign cyber actors have stolen 
sensitive U.S. national security information and valuable commercial 
information for intelligence purposes and economic gain. The Committee has 
noted with growing concern a trend in cyber activity: intrusions into sensitive 
government systems and critical infrastructure. The potential for a disruptive 
or destructive attack on our infrastructure continues to be one of the most 
significant cyber threats facing the United States.99 
While the committee’s assessment may sound dire, post-CISA cyber 
events suggest much work is left to be done to ensure the security of service 
providers and users alike.  
A. AN ESCALATING CYBER THREAT LANDSCAPE 
1. Cyber-Attacks Are Expanding in Size and Scope 
The illicit acts of cyber-criminals and belligerent nation-state actors in 
cyberspace seem poised to continue. The authorizations afforded by CISA seem 
to have had a muted effect, if any, on the cyber-crimes committed. Although we 
cannot know how much damage would have otherwise been allowed absent the 
passage of CISA, “[t]he private sector continues to be plagued by cyber incidents 
ranging from systems hacking to poor practices that leave companies’ 
information exposed. In the U.S. alone, the financial loss from cybercrimes 
exceeded $1.3 billion in 2016.”100 Focusing exclusively on technical 
cybersecurity, as opposed to content-based information security risks,101 notable 
examples of cyber-attacks reported during the past two years include the Yahoo 
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email breach,102 expanded North Korean attacks,103 the Equifax breach,104 and 
the most devastating cyber-attack in history—NotPetya.105 
Most organizations now transact using the Internet, almost universally 
collecting data about their customers in amounts proportional to their level of 
success. That collected data provides an increasingly attractive target for 
nefarious actors looking to profit from acts of data theft. This conundrum 
suggests that conducting a successful business will almost invariably lead to 
criminal intrusion attempts,106 some through virtually any means possible.107 
Therefore, as long as organizations continue to expand their use of the Internet 
to deliver services to their users, every effort must be made to improve the 
security profile of their systems and networks. Given the post-CISA acceleration 
of cyber-crimes, achieving such improvements will likely require a step-
function in the effectiveness of cyber-defenses. 
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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-cyberattack.html. 
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devastating in history. Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in 
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2. Ever-Evolving Cyber-Attack Designs 
Continually looking to improve the effectiveness of cyber-attacks, cyber-
criminals and nation-state actors evolve their techniques and intrusion 
technologies. For decades, the introduction of malicious code, through one 
means or another, has been a common and successful form of cyber-attack. 
Therefore, any robust cybersecurity infrastructure naturally included an anti-
virus detection capability that would examine files on an organization’s systems 
or networks to detect malicious code,108 the most effective means of detecting 
cyber-attacks that required some form of code execution on the target 
organization’s systems.109 The year 2017 saw the advent of malware-less cyber-
attacks, which are enabled through existing, authorized code execution pathways 
and no longer require the introduction of a file containing malicious code into 
the target organization’s systems to be effective.110 This new type of cyber-
attack introduces another dimension of risk to organizations’ systems and 
networks, as the anti-virus detection capabilities organizations have so heavily 
relied on may become obsolete.  
B. LIABILITY CONCERNS INHIBIT INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
Adding to the increasing frequency and strength of cyber-attacks, 
organizations appear to fail to leverage the intelligence sharing schemes 
available to them under CISA. Despite the fact that cyber “[t]hreat intelligence 
sharing is believed to improve the security posture of organizations and the 
nation’s critical infrastructure,”111 “potential liability . . . keep[s] some 
organizations from fully participating.”112 It is unclear whether these concerns 
are due to a lack of understanding of the legal immunity provided by CISA for 
the sharing of CTIs and DMs, or due to the ambiguity in the types of data for 
which CISA provides authorization. For example, if an NFE has logged a list of 
IOCs but has yet to draft complex CTI data structures for these IOCs, that NFE 
would likely be liable if one of its cyber-analysts chose to share that list with a 
peer NFE as these would not be properly formatted CTIs. Such ambiguities 
likely have some measure of chilling effect on any non-CTI and non-DM—in 
other words, ROD—sharing among NFEs since such sharing is technically not 
authorized under CISA. As a result, as long as the cybersecurity community’s 
understanding of the immunity afforded to NFEs for their acts of sharing does 
not improve, the effectiveness of the intelligence sharing authorized by CISA 
will likely remain muted. Moreover, as the most likely interpretation of the CISA 
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text suggests no immunity is afforded to NFEs for the sharing of ROD,113 it is 
even more likely that little to no ROD will be shared among NFEs except the 
ROD collected by third-party cybersecurity firms authorized to monitor other 
NFEs’ networks.  
As a result, NFEs have limited choices. Analogizing again to castle 
defenses, one option is for NFEs to collect their own ROD, with the limited 
visibility afforded from their own castle walls, and to analyze that ROD by 
further enriching it with the cyber threat intelligence provided through CTIs and 
DMs received from other castle owners or through fee-based cyber threat 
intelligence data feeds. NFEs choosing this option would not directly benefit 
from the ROD collected from the walls of neighboring castles; thus, their 
analyses would lack the perspective of footprints left in the snow at or around 
those neighboring castles. This option is equivalent to castle defenders being 
limited to line-of-sight visibility and to reports received from allies who have 
successfully identified nefarious actors (CTIs) and how to defend against them 
(DMs), a process fraught with shortcomings such as limited allies, likely time 
delays in the development and delivery of reports, and generally poor situational 
awareness.  
Alternatively, NFEs could authorize third-party cybersecurity firms to 
monitor their respective information systems and networks with the expectation 
that those firms will have superior aggregate visibility. In that case, 
cybersecurity firms are akin to feudal lords providing protection to a network of 
castles, benefiting from the aggregate intelligence derived from the analysis of 
ROD collected across the network of castle defenses for which they are 
responsible. Cybersecurity firms, in turn, leverage the cyber threat intelligence 
developed through this aggregation of ROD as a competitive advantage to attract 
new clients.114 Unfortunately, these strategies then preclude such firms from 
freely sharing the CTIs and DMs so derived, as these have become part of these 
firms’ value proposition. 
The net effect of such limited ROD sharing, therefore, is that NFEs are 
either limited to the perspective available from their own castle walls, or enjoy 
the expanded perspective and protection offered by a cybersecurity firm. The 
latter certainly allows the limited number of clients of a given cybersecurity firm 
to leverage the value of collected ROD, but that leverage of value is generally 
limited to the finite number of clients of that cybersecurity firm and no more.  
C. THE ADVENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
The challenges associated with the acceleration of cyber-attacks, the 
evolution of cyber threats, and the chilled participation in cyber threat 
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intelligence sharing together present a daunting challenge to Internet security. 
The advent of AI and the leverage of such technologies by nefarious actors will 
likely accelerate and amplify these risks. Therefore, despite the news headlines 
being filled with references to AI and its positive implications to our daily lives, 
for the purpose of this Note it is important to understand the basic attributes of 
AI systems and their potential applications to the domain of cybersecurity.  
1. From Chronically Emerging to Ubiquitous 
In his recent book entitled AI Super-Powers: China, Silicon Valley, and the 
New World Order, Dr. Kai-Fu Lee details the history of AI research since his 
days as a doctoral candidate at Carnegie Mellon University in the 1980s, the 
struggles AI researchers had to overcome to produce useful technologies, and 
the implications of societies’ broad adoption of AI for today and tomorrow.115 
Dr. Lee is the Chairman and CEO of Sinovation Ventures and President of 
Sinovation Venture’s Artificial Intelligence Institute. Prior to founding 
Sinovation in 2009, Dr. Lee led Google China as its President and had previously 
held executive positions at Microsoft, SGI, and Apple.116 
Research into artificial intelligence started as early as the 1950s, the dawn 
of the computer age.117 By the 1980s, “the field of [AI] had forked into two 
camps: the ‘rule-based’ approach and the ‘neural networks’ approach.”118 The 
former attempted to “teach computers to think by encoding a series of logical 
rules,” whereas the latter attempted to simulate the human brain itself, enabling 
computers to learn from exposure to “lots and lots of examples of a given 
phenomenon.”119 Unfortunately, for decades both of these approaches were 
plagued by resource constraints.120  
“What ultimately resuscitated the field of neural networks . . . were 
changes to two of the key raw ingredients that neural networks feed on, along 
with one major technical breakthrough.”121 “Neural networks require large 
amounts of two things: computing power and data.”122 The latter provides the 
numerous examples the neural network needs to learn from, and the former 
provides the power to sift through those numerous examples.123 Both data and 
computing power were historically in short supply, but today our smartphones 
provide millions of times more processing power than NASA used to put Neil 
Armstrong on the moon, and the Internet activity of billions of users has led to 
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an explosion of available data.124 Moreover, the wide adoption of the Internet 
for daily use has dramatically increased the amount and variety of data available 
to data scientists as “[m]ore data has been created in the past two years than in 
the entire previous history of mankind.”125 In parallel, scientists achieved a 
significant breakthrough in neural network technology with vastly more efficient 
computer training capabilities.126 These advances in infrastructure, data 
availability, and efficiency in computer training have set the stage for an 
explosion in the applications of AI across a range of industries including 
cybersecurity. 
2. Neural Networks and Deep Learning 
If a neural network is designed to learn like a human and to exhibit human-
like behavior once taught, then it must be trained by exposing it, like a human, 
to vast amounts of data thus transforming it into a functional AI system.127 When 
the learning is focused on a very specific domain, such as voice recognition, data 
scientists will apply deep learning training techniques to further improve the 
effectiveness of the AI system.128  
Deep learning “use[s] massive amounts of data from a specific domain to 
make a decision that optimizes for a desired outcome. It does this by training 
itself to recognize deeply buried patterns and correlations connecting the many 
data points to the desired outcome.”129  
Doing this requires massive amounts of relevant data, a strong algorithm, a 
narrow domain, and a concrete goal. If you’re short any one of these, things fall 
apart. Too little data? The algorithm doesn’t have enough examples to uncover 
meaningful correlations. Too broad a goal? The algorithm lacks clear 
benchmarks to shoot for in optimization.130 
An obvious and desirable application of neural networks and deep learning 
is to the detection of movements and actions of nefarious actors within an 
organization’s network and across multiple organizations’ environments. 
3. Application of AI to Cybersecurity 
 “AI-based technologies provide deeper security than what humans alone 
can provide . . . [and t]he deployment of AI-based security technologies 
simplifies the process of detecting and responding to application security threats 
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and vulnerabilities.”131 But given the nature of deep learning, its application to 
cybersecurity requires that very large amounts of raw evidence of system and 
network activity be made available to neural networks. This data is necessary to 
train neural networks to understand normal behavior in an organization’s 
network, a baseline from which the AI system could then differentiate 
anomalous events associated with network breaches.  
In light of AI’s promise of improved efficiency and effectiveness in the 
hunt for cyber threats, an explosion of AI-based cybersecurity solutions is being 
brought to market by cybersecurity vendors, large and small.132 However, “AI-
based technologies improve [cyber]security but will not reduce the need for 
staff. Working together, AI and IT security personnel can have a positive impact 
on organizations’ cybersecurity posture,”133 but AI is unlikely to solve the 
critical shortage of cybersecurity expertise.134 As a result, while AI may present 
one element of the solution needed to stem the acceleration of post-CISA cyber-
attacks, further investment in the number and skills of cyber-analysts will 
continue to be required.135  
4. AI-Enabled Cyber Threats 
“While AI may be the best hope for slowing the tide of cyber-attacks and 
breaches, it may also create more advanced attacker tactics in the short-term,”136 
hence AI presents itself as a double-edged sword to the cybersecurity 
community. “Sixty-two percent of surveyed [2017 Blackhat]137 attendees 
believe that there is a high possibility that AI could be used by hackers for 
offensive purposes” by the end of 2018.138 “In fact, as cybercriminals and nation-
states begin using AI to increase the rate of attacks, the need for smarter solutions 
that can help human security teams keep up will only become more apparent.”139 
 
 131. PONEMON INST., THE VALUE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN CYBERSECURITY 4 fig.2 (2018).  
 132. E.g., Lily Hay Newman, AI Can Help Cybersecurity—If It Can Fight Through the Hype, WIRED (Apr. 
29, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-machine-learning-cybersecurity/ (characterizing the 
availability of AI-based cybersecurity solutions at the RSA security conference, the largest global conference 
dedicated to commercial cybersecurity solutions). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See infra Subpart II.D (outlining the critical shortage in trained cyber-analysts affecting organizations’ 
ability to protect themselves). 
 135. See infra Subpart II.D. 
 136. The Cylance Team, Black Hat Attendees See AI as a Double-Edged Sword, THREATVECTOR: 
SPOTLIGHT (Aug. 1, 2017), https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/black-hat-attendees-see-ai-as-double-
edged-sword.html.  
 137. “Black Hat is the most technical and relevant information security event series in the world. For more 
than 20 years, Black Hat Briefings have provided attendees with the very latest in information security research, 
development, and trends in a strictly vendor-neutral environment.” About Us, BLACK HAT, 
https://www.blackhat.com/about.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
 138. The Cylance Team, supra note 136. 
 139. Id. 
February 2020] INADEQUACIES OF CISA IN THE AGE OF AI 527 
Unfortunately, nefarious actors in cyberspace are learning to weaponize AI 
to serve their illicit purposes.140 “AI can make attacks very evasive, very 
targeted, and . . . bring an entire[ly] new scale and speed to attacks, with 
reasoning, and with autonomous approaches that can be built into attacks to 
work completely independently from the attackers.”141 Therefore, while AI can 
serve the purpose of improving efficiency and accuracy in detecting cyber-
attacks, we already know that AI can make attacks significantly more effective 
and accurate, and potentially more devastating.  
[T]he 9/11 Commission report characterized the failures that led to that attack 
on our country as a “failure of imagination.” . . . [T]he failure to detect and 
disrupt the Russian government’s weaponization of online platforms against 
the United States and our allies [could be characterized as] . . . a similar 
failure to imagine.142  
Our nation has the opportunity, now, to address the cyber-risks associated with 
AI, but time is of the essence.  
D. CRITICAL SHORTAGE OF CYBERSECURITY EXPERTISE 
As cyber-risks escalate, organizations are increasing their commitments to 
their respective cyber-defenses, causing the number of cybersecurity jobs to 
more than triple over the next five years.143 In fact, “[a]ccording to one estimate, 
by 2021 an estimated 3.5 million cybersecurity jobs will be unfilled. And of the 
candidates who apply, fewer than one in four are even qualified.”144 A survey of 
Chief Information Security Officers indicates that “[a]utomation improves 
cybersecurity posture but does not reduce the need for in-house expertise. Sixty-
two percent of respondents say automation, [including] artificial 
intelligence[,] . . . is not going to reduce the need for IT expertise but will 
enhance the productivity and effectiveness of skilled staff.”145  
III.  CISA AMENDMENT PROPOSAL 
Given the chronic shortage of skilled cybersecurity analysts, unless 
something dramatic changes in the degree of automation and efficacy of 
cybersecurity solutions, the risks to organizations’ systems and networks are 
 
 140. See Dan Patterson, How Weaponized AI Creates a New Breed of Cyber-Attacks, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug. 
16, 2018, 9:25 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-weaponized-ai-creates-a-new-breed-of-cyber-
attacks/. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Foreign Influence Operations and Their Use of Social Media Platforms: Hearing Before the S. Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Laura Rosenberger, Alliance for Securing Democracy, 
the German Marshall Fund of the United States). 
 143. Steve Morgan, Cybersecurity Talent Crunch to Create 3.5 Million Unfileld Jobs Globally by 2021, 
CYBERCRIME MAG. (Oct. 24, 2019), https://cybersecurityventures.com/jobs/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).   
 144. Erin Winick, A Cyber-Skills Shortage Means Students Are Being Recruited to Fight Off Hackers, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612309/a-cyber-skills-shortage-means-
students-are-being-recruited-to-fight-off-hackers/?source=download-metered-content (citing Morgan, supra 
note 143). 
 145. PONEMON INST., SEPARATING THE TRUTHS FROM THE MYTHS IN CYBERSECURITY 5 (2018). 
528 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:501 
only likely to escalate from current levels. AI can play an important role in 
addressing these concerns, at least in part, but Congress must decide the quality 
and quantity of data that will be made available to cyber-analysts to enable their 
AI-powered cyber-defenses.  
A cyber-attack is rarely, if ever, a singular frontal attack against an 
organization’s cyber-defenses. Instead, would-be cyber-criminals apply 
malicious reconnaissance, enumeration, penetration, exfiltration, and sanitation 
techniques,146 for which stealth is a critical success factor. Importantly, and in 
keeping with military tactics, if a cyber-analyst could improve her situational 
awareness by extending her visibility to her virtual neighbors’ castle walls in 
addition to her own,147 then that analyst’s ability to observe would-be attackers’ 
movements and tactics would dramatically improve her chances of detecting and 
inhibiting that would-be attacker’s actions at her own castle defenses. It could 
be very tempting to suggest that a cyber-analyst could just wait for her neighbors 
to publish CTIs and DMs based on their own perspective, but it is sometimes 
through the accumulation of observations across environments that one can 
finally discern modus operandi and attack patterns of a would-be nefarious actor.  
A. AUTHORIZING ROD SHARING AMONG NFES 
While AI is not positioned to completely displace humans in cybersecurity 
roles, it has become a very effective tool for detecting anomalies in massive 
amounts of data based on established patterns of normalcy, the very essence of 
cyber-attack detection.148 AI can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
cybersecurity solutions, but only if these solutions are afforded the necessary 
data from which to learn.149 Hence, Congress should amend CISA, authorizing 
NFEs to share ROD150 among themselves with the same civil and criminal 
immunity currently afforded by CISA for the sharing of CTIs and DMs. Doing 
so would be tantamount to shining bright lights on all the footsteps in the snow 
left at or near all the castle defense systems of those choosing to share ROD, 
thus allowing cyber-analysts to observe the movements of would-be cyber-
criminals as they perform pre-attack surveillance, or other suspicious acts,151 
before such actors effectively breach their respective castle defenses.  
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1. The Benefits Outweigh the Risks 
In the absence of such a bold data sharing strategy, cyber-analysts will 
largely be left to defending their walls, limited to their respective visibility albeit 
possibly enriched by cyber threat intelligence received from others.152 The 
organizations they aim to protect would continue to be condemned to being 
attacked first before pursuing the attackers by following the “breadcrumbs” left 
behind, much as certain technologists advocated in their letter to Congress in 
dissent to the passage of CISA.153 This more limited strategy, which CISA 
affords us today, has proven to be of limited effectiveness in stemming the tide 
of cyber-crime.154  
On the other hand, while an explicit authorization for NFEs to share ROD 
among themselves would enhance their respective situational awareness and 
resulting abilities to defend themselves, this recommendation comes at the cost 
of reduced privacy for consumers. Although true, this proposal lives at the 
tension point between consumer privacy and the protection of the data 
consumers deposit in trust with online service providers who are charged with 
securing that data. To deny NFEs the access to technologies and supporting data 
necessary to thwart modern AI-powered cyber-attacks would render hollow any 
calls to those NFEs for securing users’ privacy, as nefarious actors will continue 
to prevail in the game of one-upmanship we have observed since the use of the 
Internet has gone mainstream.155  
2. ROD Is Already Defined in the CISA Data Sharing Specification 
The utility of ROD to cyber-analysts is nothing new. The DHS adopted 
STIX/TAXII as the technical specification for the CTI/DM data sharing 
requirements of CISA.156 The version of that specification in general release at 
the time of the enactment of CISA did not include the notion of ROD,157 except 
as an extension of a CTI data structure.158 As of July 2017, ROD is now defined 
as its own type of data on equal footing with CTIs and DMs in the STIX 2.0 
specification.159 While the authors of the STIX 2.0 specification might not have 
necessarily envisioned the level of ROD sharing recommended herein, the utility 
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2020) (showing May 15, 2015 as the release date for STIX 1.2). 
 158. STIX 1.2, MITRE CORP., https://stixproject.github.io/releases/1.2/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (detailing 
the object classes included in the STIX 1.2 specification including the Indicator class (CTIs) but lacking the 
Observed Data class (ROD)).  
 159. STIX™ Version 2.0. Part 2: STIX Objects, OASIS (July 19, 2017), http://docs.oasis-
open.org/cti/stix/v2.0/cs01/part2-stix-objects/stix-v2.0-cs01-part2-stix-objects.html#_Toc496714322 
(showing, in sections 2.5 and 2.8, the Indicator and Observed Data class definitions, respectively). 
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of ROD to cyber-analysts was sufficient to elevate it to its own data object class 
within the STIX 2.0 specification.  
3. The Federal Government Should Be Excluded from Receiving ROD 
Under CISA, only NFEs are authorized to monitor the systems and 
networks of other NFEs or federal entities who have granted authorization for 
that monitoring.160 By implication, the federal government is not authorized to 
monitor NFEs’ systems and networks, and therefore does not have access to 
NFEs’ ROD. This design choice supports a sound privacy argument, and privacy 
advocates likely argued for that limitation in the wake of the Snowden 
Disclosures.161 For like reasons, the federal government should be excluded 
from any ROD sharing schemes under this proposal, leaving it no worse off than 
with the current CISA statute, still able to receive and share CTIs and DMs but 
not ROD.  
4. ROD Sharing Is in the Public Interest 
Sharing more personal data than is already authorized under CISA has deep 
privacy implications, and finding the appropriate balance of privacy parameters 
for the implementation of this recommendation is not without its challenges. The 
tension between the desire to maximize the public good of Internet safety and 
the robust protection of privacy rights is hardly unique to the domain of 
cybersecurity. In fact, similar tension is evidenced in tech giants’ adoption of AI 
in the broader technology sense.162 As the AngelList Weekly has described: 
The competition among tech giants over AI isn’t just an arms race—it’s a 
battle of philosophies. On one side, companies like Google—despite taking 
PR hits over user privacy concerns—are focused on providing the most 
ubiquitous, accessible AI-powered services. Their bet: Ease of use and 
accessibility will outweigh consumer privacy concerns. Others, like Apple, 
take the opposite stance, betting a strong focus on privacy will continue to be 
a differentiating factor for consumers.163 
A similar battle of philosophies could be at play in response to this Note’s 
recommendation.  
U.S. decision-makers have not yet confronted the necessity to make PII 
available to cyber-analysts to ensure public Internet safety. However, Drs. Clare 
Sullivan and Eric Burger, Georgetown University researchers in law and 
computer science, respectively, have analyzed the tension between public 
Internet safety and privacy rights with respect to the sharing of IP addresses (a 
very specific kind of cyber-relevant ROD) in the context of the European 
 
 160. See supra Subpart I.C.2. 
 161. See Macaskill & Dance, supra note 59. 
 162. Apple’s Quiet AI Acquisition, ANGELLIST WKLY (ANGELLIST, San Francisco, California), Nov. 21, 
2018, https://angel.co/newsletters/apple-s-quiet-ai-acquisition-112118?email_uid=853898960&utm_campaign 
=platform-newsletter-112118&utm_content=view-online&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter-
newsletter&utm_term=. 
 163. Id. 
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General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)164 and its predecessor, the 1995 
Directive.165 It can be instructive to study this example because it parallels the 
question at hand, i.e., should public Internet safety outweigh the need for 
absolute privacy with relation to a very valuable kind of cyber-relevant PII such 
as an IP address? In their view,  
[T]he sharing of IP addresses as cyber-threat intelligence can be justified in 
the public interest under Article 6(1)(e) of the GDPR to which the 
notification requirements of Articles 13 and 14 do not apply.166 Sharing of 
threat intelligence is in the public interest and that interest overrides the 
individual rights of a data subject under Article 8(1)167 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union which underpins the GDPR and 
its equivalent in the 1995 Directive as long as the concepts of necessity and 
proportionality-of-purpose are adhered to in respect of the design of the 
specific measures proposed.168 
According to this analysis, European courts would likely rule against 
individuals bringing privacy actions against private or public entities logging or 
sharing IP addresses for cybersecurity purposes, a necessary response whose 
purpose is proportional to the threat, despite the fact that IP addresses may be 
considered personal information in certain circumstances.169 Applying this 
principle of security-over-privacy to a CISA context, authorizing NFEs to share 
ROD containing authorized PII, such as IP addresses,170 should be considered in 
the public interest as public Internet safety and the security of online users’ 
private data should take precedence over their individual rights to privacy. 
B. LIMITING PII SHARING THROUGH DATA SEGMENTATION/AUTHORIZATION 
Acknowledging the need to respect individual privacy rights while 
enabling an effective ROD sharing model, this proposed CISA amendment 
should also include provisions for granular PII definitions, segmentation, and 
sharing authorization. Unlike the more recently enacted CCPA,171 CISA does 
not explicitly define PII other than to require those sharing CTIs or DMs to 
 
 164. See generally General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 33. 
 165. See Clare Sullivan & Eric Burger, “In the Public Interest”: The Privacy Implications of International 
Business-to-Business Sharing of Cyber-Threat Intelligence, 33 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 14, 14 (2017). 
 166. General Data Protection Regulation Article 13 defines certain requirements placed on system operators 
for notifying system users when their personal data is being captured from them directly, whereas Article 14 
defines certain notification requirements in the event users’ personal data is acquired but not from them directly.  
 167. A “data subject” is defined as an identified or identifiable natural person. General Data Protection 
Regulation, supra note 33.at art. 4, § 1.  
 168. Sullivan & Burger, supra note 165, at 29. 
 169. Id. at 22–24 (reviewing a case where a German court dismissed a private citizen’s claim of privacy 
infringement, holding that a dynamic IP address is not personal information if the mapping of the address to a 
person requires cross-reference information only obtainable from a third-party such as an ISP and therefore not 
associated directly with their person).  
 170. See infra Subpart III.B (outlining a proposal for the segmentation of the types of PII that should be 
authorized to be shared as ROD). 
 171. CCPA § 1798.140(o)(1) (offering a non-exhaustive, yet reasonably complete, list of the types of data 
the California legislature considered PII). 
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redact information the entity “knows at the time of sharing to be personal 
information of a specific individual or information that identifies a specific 
individual.”172 This lack of specific PII definition and resulting vagueness in 
definition of CTIs and DMs fueled strong dissenting opinions while CISA was 
being debated.173 
As pertains to cybersecurity, not all PII is made equal. For example, while 
IP and email addresses are often prized for their value to cybersecurity analysis, 
intimate personal data such as health or financial data rarely are, if ever. The 
drafters of the STIX 2.0 specification thought this matter through in detail and 
have produced a specification of those types of ROD that are relevant to 
cybersecurity analysis as of the release of that specification.174 The use of the 
expanded STIX 2.0 specification would be a natural evolution of the CISA data 
sharing model as STIX is already defined as the data sharing specification for 
data shared through the DHS under CISA.175  
Contrary to the existing CISA broad-brush approach, the recommended 
amendment should segment PII into two categories: cyber-relevant PII such as 
are defined in the STIX 2.0 specification176 and more sensitive PII such as health 
and financial information. This improved definition and segmentation of PII 
should be made applicable to all types of data being shared under CISA, 
including CTIs, DMs, and ROD. This approach would provide much clearer 
bright-line rules for the sharing of PII, thus improving NFE participation as a 
result of reduced litigation risk and, at the same time, reducing users’ privacy 
concerns as they will be more assured that the sharing of their most sensitive 
data not necessary to cyber-analysis will be strictly forbidden. 
This proposed amendment itself need not be explicit in the definitions and 
segmentation of PII. Instead, Congress should direct the DHS, as part of its CISA 
stewardship role, to develop and maintain the details regarding PII definitions 
and segmentation as a set of regulations under standard APA rule-making 
 
 172. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, 6 U.S.C. § 1502(b)(1)(E)(i). 
 173. One comment letter sent on behalf of many civil society organizations, companies, and security experts 
argued that “the definitions for ‘cyber threat,’ and ‘cyber threat indicator,’ [were] concerning because they [were] 
unnecessarily broad.” Letter from Access et al., to Barack Obama, Former President of the United States (July 
27, 2015), https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4459-pr-massive-coalition-of-security-experts-companies-
and-civil-society-groups-urge-obama-to-veto-cisa/Final_Coalition%20Ltr%20Urging%20Pres.%20to%20 
%20CISA.8b33e2d86dc14780b35c9cde44a41797.pdf (urging President Obama to strongly oppose the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015).  
 174. STIX™ Version 2.0. Part 4: Cyber Observable Objects, OASIS (July 19, 2017), https://docs.oasis-
open.org/cti/stix/v2.0/stix-v2.0-part4-cyber-observable-objects.html (“STIX Cyber Observables document the 
facts concerning what happened on a network or host, but not necessarily the who or when, and never the why. 
For example, information about a file that existed, a process that was observed running, or that network traffic 
occurred between two IPs can all be captured as Cyber Observable data.”). The classes of observable data 
included in STIX 2.0 are non-exhaustive. Id. “Objects and properties not included in STIX 2.0, but deemed 
necessary by the community, will be included in future releases.” Id. 
 175. See supra Subpart III.A.2 (detailing the adoption of STIX/TAXII as the technical specification for 
sharing data with the DHS under CISA). 
 176. See supra Subpart III.A.2.   
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procedures.177 The non-exhaustive nature of the STIX 2.0 ROD specification 
would readily accommodate such a malleable approach to managing the 
definitions of various subsets of PII.178 
CONCLUSION 
CISA has had a muted effect on the continued escalation of cyber-attacks. 
Since its passage into law in late 2015, AI has emerged as a powerful technology 
capable of performing certain tasks better than humans, including some aspects 
of cybersecurity analysis. The value of AI to the execution of mundane tasks has 
not escaped the attention of cyber-criminals who have been weaponizing AI to 
their own benefit. The drafters of CISA failed to anticipate the data sharing 
requirements of AI-powered cybersecurity solutions required to counter this 
emerging weaponization. NFEs stand to benefit from expanded CISA data 
sharing authorizations to include ROD, allowing their cyber-analysts to gain 
vastly improved situational awareness. The proposal herein provides for such an 
expanded data sharing scheme among NFEs only, to the exclusion of the federal 
government. In an effort to improve the overall privacy profile of CISA, these 
recommendations also include a more refined definition and segmentation of PII 
and limiting the sharing of PII under CISA to authorized, cyber-relevant PII 
only. With these improvements, NFEs will be better equipped to construct the 
AI-powered solutions we will need to face tomorrow’s cyber threats. 
  
 
 177. See The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/open_gov/Administrative-Procedure-Act.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
 178. See supra note 174. 
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